The failure of neoclassical economics modelling and human behavioural ecology to satisfactorily explain the evolution of Neolithic societies by Tisdell, Clem & Svizzero, Serge
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN: 1444-8890 
ECONOMIC THEORY, 
APPLICATIONS AND ISSUES 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND 
 
Working Paper No. 71 
 
The Failure of Neoclassical Economics 
Modelling and Human Behavioural Ecology to 
Satisfactorily Explain the Evolution of Neolithic 
Societies 
by 
 Clem Tisdell  
And 
Serge Svizzero 
 
February, 2015 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1444-8890 
ECONOMIC THEORY, APPLICATIONS AND ISSUES 
(Working Paper) 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 71 
 
The Failure of Neoclassical Economics Modelling and 
Human Behavioural Ecology to Satisfactorily Explain the 
Evolution of Neolithic Society 
by 
Clem Tisdell* 
And  
Serge Svizzero† 
 
February 2015 
 
 
© All rights reserved 
 
  
                                                          
*  School of Economics, The University of Queensland, St. Lucia Campus, Brisbane QLD 4072, 
Australia. Email: c.tisdell@economics.uq.edu.au 
†  Faculté de Droit et d’Economie, Université de La Réunion, 15 Avenue René Cassin. BP 7151, 97715 
Saint Denis, France. Email: serge.svizzero@univ-reunion.fr  
 
 
 
 
 
` 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS IN THE SERIES, Economic Theory, Applications and Issues, are 
published by the School of Economics, University of Queensland, 4072, Australia. 
Production of the series Economic Theory, Applications and Issues and two additional 
sets were initiated by Professor Clem Tisdell. The other two sets are Economics 
Ecology and Environment and Social Economics, Policy and Development. A full list of 
all papers in each set can be accessed at the following website: 
http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/clem-tisdell-working-papers  
For more information write to Professor Clem Tisdell, School of Economics, University 
of Queensland, St. Lucia Campus, Brisbane 4072, Australia or email 
c.tisdell@economics.uq.edu.au 
In addition, the following working papers are produced with the Risk and Sustainable 
Management Group and are available at the website indicated. Murray-Darling Basin 
Program, Risk and Uncertainty Program, Australian Public Policy Program, Climate 
Change Program :http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/working-papers-rsmg  
For further information about these papers, contact Professor John Quiggin, Email: 
j.quiggin@uq.edu.au 
 
1 
 
The Failure of Neoclassical Economics Modelling and Human 
Behavioural Ecology to Satisfactorily Explain the Evolution of 
Neolithic Societies  
ABSTRACT 
Examines two parallel approaches, one in economics and the other in anthropology, 
intended to explain the behaviours of Neolithic societies, particularly their transit from 
foraging to agriculture. Both approaches assume that human behaviour is a response to 
rational human decisions to optimise. The application of microeconomic theory by a 
Danish professor to explain the transition of foragers to agriculture and the 
corresponding complementary views of some American anthropologists about this 
transition are outlined and discussed. While these approaches provide valuable insights 
into the evolution of Neolithic societies, it is also important to be aware of their 
limitations, several of which are identified in this article. Such approaches are unlikely 
to provide a general theory of the evolution of Neolithic societies. Because of the 
diversity of human behaviours, a range of theories are required. 
Keywords: Economic evolution; economic optimisation; human behavioural ecology; 
hunter-gatherers; Neolithic Revolution; satisficing behaviour. 
JEL Classification: D01, O10, P00, Q10 
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The Failure of Neoclassical Economics Modelling and Human 
Behavioural Ecology to Satisfactorily Explain the Evolution of 
Neolithic Societies  
1. Introduction 
Weisdorf (2005) uses comparative microeconomic analysis to explain and integrate 
different theories (mostly proposed by anthropologists and archaeologists) of why 
several Neolithic societies began switching from exclusively depending on hunting and 
gathering for their livelihood to engaging in some agriculture and becoming eventually, 
in many cases, highly reliant on it. Seemingly unaware of Weisdorf’s comparative static 
analysis (because they do not refer to it), the anthropologists, Winterhalder and Kennett 
(2006, p. 11), extoll the virtue of using (modern) microeconomic concepts to explain the 
transition of foraging societies to agriculture. This type of approach is classified in the 
anthropological literature as part of human behavioural ecology1. Winterhalder and 
Kennett claim that the virtue of this approach is that it enables many different theories 
of the transition of Neolithic societies to agriculture to be integrated. Weisdorf’s (2005) 
analysis bears this claim out. Winterhalder and Kennett (2009, 2006) single out 
marginal values, optimisation, opportunity costs, risk-sensitive behaviour, discounting, 
transaction costs and economies of scale as highly promising concepts for analysing the 
evolution of Neolithic societies, but do not provide detailed applications of these 
concepts in these papers.  
Nevertheless, specific applications of human behavioural ecology are available. Several 
early applications are, for example, in Winterhalder and Smith (1981) where the main 
emphasis is on general features of hunting-gathering strategies of foragers, taking into 
account selected measures of costs and benefits of alternative strategies. However, it is 
probably less difficult to apply behavioural ecology to this particular subject than to the 
determinants of transition of foraging societies to agriculture. Yet, even in this case, 
human behavioural ecology seems to give insufficient attention to cultural influences on 
the behaviour of foragers, as is apparent from the studies of Bird-David (1992). While 
the influence of the cultural dimension on human behaviour has been taken into account 
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by very few economists (conventional institutionalists, such as Veblen (1934) being 
exceptions) most mainstream economists ignore this factor in their analysis, and 
Weisdorf (2005) is no exception. This is because Weisdorf’s contribution to explaining 
the evolution of Neolithic societies relies on neoclassical microeconomic modelling.  
Weisdorf (2005, p. 568) points out that many archaeologists and anthropologists have 
used economic concepts (at least, implicitly) to explain the occurrence of the Neolithic 
Revolution (that is, the commencement of agriculture) but few economists have done 
likewise ‘despite its [the Neolithic Revolution’s] tremendous impact on economic 
growth and the wealth of nations.’ This revolution eventually resulted in most societies 
depending heavily on agriculture for their economic welfare, enabled increased 
urbanisation to occur, and provided essential support for the Industrial Revolution, for 
example, by supplying food for industrial workers. It is, therefore, little wonder that 
Physiocrats, such as Quesnay (Kuczynski and Meek, 1972), regarded agriculture as the 
prime source of economic wealth. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the analysis of Weisdorf (which entails the use 
of marginal values, optimisation and the neoclassical approach to economic choices) 
and then consider the scope for applying the concepts which Winterhalder and Kennett 
single out for special mention; several of which are apparent in Weisdorf’s analysis. A 
general discussion and concluding comments then follow. 
2. Weisdorf’s (2005) Analysis of the Transition from Foraging to Agriculture 
Examined 
The type of standardised model used by Weisdorf (2005) to explain different reasons for 
the transition of hunting-gathering societies to agriculture is shown in Figure 1. He uses 
it to illustrate three types of theories which have been proposed for the shifting of 
Neolithic societies to agriculture. These types include explanations based on increased 
populations, on the falling relative productivity of hunting-gathering, or on the rising 
relative productivity of agriculture. In these cases, the comparative economic benefit of 
engaging in some agriculture increases. In Figure 1, the line marked AB represents the 
marginal physical productivity of labour used in hunting and gathering and that marked 
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BC in the marginal physical productivity of labour engaged in agriculture which, for 
simplicity, Weisdorf assumes to be constant. Nevertheless, it is not only for simplicity 
that Weisdorf assumes that the regional productivity of labour employed in early 
agriculture is constant. He is also of the view that fertile land was plentiful relative to 
the level of the Neolithic populations initially contemplating the adoption of agriculture 
as an option and so, the marginal productivity of agriculture for these populations was 
actually constant.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Weisdorf’s standard model with minor presentational adjustment. 
 
Given the relationship shown in Figure 1, a hunter-gatherer society has no economic 
incentive to commence agricultural production unless its labour force (proxy for 
population size, which is assumed to be a constant multiple of the size of the labour 
force) exceeds L2. If, for example, its available units of labour increase from L1 to L3, 
this society finds it economic to switch from total reliance on foraging for its livelihood 
to using L3– L2 of its available units of labour in agricultural production and L2 in 
hunting and gathering. Furthermore, this theory predicts that, all other things being held 
constant, an increase in the productivity of labour in agricultural production or a 
reduction in marginal physical yields from foraging will result in a higher proportion of 
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its units of labour being engaged in agriculture. In the former case, MPA shifts upwards 
and in the latter case MPHG moves downwards. At first sight, this seems to be a 
straightforward and convincing approach to explaining the transition of hunter-gatherers 
to agriculture. However, closer consideration of the theory reveals some unresolved 
issues.  
First, it is widely accepted (see Lee and Daly, 2004, p. 4) that sharing of the product 
was the norm in most foraging societies. If so, economic decisions in such societies 
seem more likely to have been based on the average product available to tribal members 
rather than the marginal product. Consequently, the total product may not have been 
maximised for the amount of labour used and switching to agriculture would have been 
delayed compared to Weisdorf’s prediction. Furthermore, it is possible that when it 
initially began, agriculture was a communal activity involving sharing by tribal 
members, that is, it was a primitive form of communism, even though this did not 
continue once agriculture was able to yield a significant surplus. Therefore, adapting 
Weisdorf’s standard diagram, the representation shown in Figure 2 appears to be more 
relevant. There the relationship AFC represents the average product of labour. No 
labour is engaged in agriculture in this case unless the labour force exceeds L3. For 
example, if the available number of units of labour become L4 and the tribal band is 
guided by average product, L4– L3 of labour would be allocated to agriculture. 
However, it is possible after some agricultural production begins that L3– L2 of labour 
is withdrawn from foraging to work in agriculture because it may become evident that 
the productivity of these units would be higher in agriculture. This would increase the 
total product and the average level of income available to tribal members. It would 
result in L4– L2 units of labour being allocated to agriculture, thereby maximising the 
output of the society relative in its effort. 
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Figure 2: Early Neolithic societies may have based their production choices on 
average rather than marginal productivity because of the prevalence of 
sharing by community members. Given Weisdorf’s analysis, this could 
have delayed (as is illustrated) their transition to agriculture. 
 
Second, Weisdorf (2005) relies primarily on neoclassical microeconomic analysis. This 
assumes that decision-makers have a considerable amount of knowledge about 
economic relationships. In reality, however, most early hunter-gatherers might have 
been very uncertain about their comparative returns from adopting agriculture. 
Presumably, they needed to learn about the value of adopting agriculture by 
experimentation and by learning-by-doing, both of which are not costless activities. 
Because there were no markets (or well developed ones) in early Neolithic times, the 
option of engaging in decentralised information-efficient decision-making of the type 
eloquently described by Hayek (1948) did not exist. Lack of knowledge about 
production possibilities and surrounding uncertainty (especially about the prospects of 
agriculture) presumably had a major impact on the decision-making of Neolithic tribes 
about the adoption of agriculture. 
Depending on their geographical situation and the stock of potential domesticates 
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available, the risks faced by Neolithic communities in experimenting with agriculture 
would have varied. For example, in areas having fertile soils and regular availability of 
water for watering gardens, the risk of experimenting with agriculture might have been 
low, especially if agricultural products (and other products) could be stored. In addition, 
the comparative risks and variability of returns from foraging and agriculture would 
have presumably been taken into account. 
The question also needs to be considered of the extent to which an incremental or 
marginal transition to agriculture was economically feasible. The successful cultivation 
of most plants requires their constant management in a particular location. Where tribal 
groups needed to range over a large territory to obtain sufficient produce for their 
subsistence, settling in one location by a tribe (or settlement by a significant portion of 
it) in order to engage in agriculture would have been problematic because those 
involved in farming would have had limited available produce from foraging to 
supplement their income from agriculture. Consequently, in this case, the scope for 
gradually relinquishing hunting and gathering in order to depend increasingly on 
agriculture is quite limited. In addition, in these circumstances, farmers have limited 
social security (their safety net is weak) because they lack access to sufficient amount of 
hunting-gathering resources for their use in the event of a crop failure. They faced a 
similar problem in the latter case, to that identified by Chambers (1987) as occurring 
among some of the rural poor in developing countries. In cases where relatively 
abundant produce could be had from hunting and gathering in close proximity to an 
agricultural settlement, this would, however, not have been a serious problem. 
In some cases, ‘lumpiness of choices’ or high overhead costs, or social obstacles to 
reaching transit agreement to agriculture may have restricted the scope for incremental 
(marginal) switching to agriculture by foragers. For example, the whole tribe or a major 
portion of it may have had initially to agree to such a transition if it involved settlement 
and some major capital works may have been needed, such as the clearing of vegetation. 
Because of the existence of overhead costs, transition to agriculture of a sufficiently 
large magnitude might have been needed to recoup these costs, that is, to achieve 
economies of size. When incremental adjustment was not practical, this would have 
been a deterrent to the adoption of agriculture. 
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Other factors that can also contribute to the lumpiness of choices in switching from 
hunting-gathering to agriculture is that if a small group from a tribe switches to 
agriculture and to a settled way of life, it may fail to reproduce itself, as is evident from 
the Allee effect (Courchamp, Berec, and Gascoigne, 2008). Furthermore, a small group 
is likely to be more vulnerable to being wiped out by invaders than a large group. This 
all suggests that the likely success of an initial agricultural settlement probably depends 
on its size. 
Another limitation of Weisdorf’s (2005) model is that it does not consider the trade-off 
between work and leisure. Weisdorf appears to assume the effort and time spent by each 
‘labourer’ is unchanged whether or not they are engaged in foraging or in agriculture. 
The available evidence, however, indicates that this was probably not so in practice.  
The question of whether and to what extent, Neolithic societies aimed for economic 
optimisation is also contentious. Weisdorf’s (2005) modelling implies that they 
maximised output relative to their effort. However, it is unclear in his analysis for what 
length of time output was maximised relative to effort. In some cases, productivity 
would have been different in the short run and in the long run. How much foresight was 
displayed by hunter-gatherers? 
Some scholars (for example, Sahlins, 1974; Gowdy, 1998) contend that not all Neolithic 
social groups were maximisers: some were satisficers. In these circumstances, the latter 
groups may have displayed a high degree of social inertia. Provided they were satisfied 
with their actual level of income (and did not aspire to a higher one), they would have 
had little or no incentive to adopt techniques or production methods which could 
increase their productivity. For example, they might have had no incentive to switch to 
agriculture in this case even if it could raise their productivity. They would only 
consider such a switch if given their current practices, they were unable to realise the 
level of income to which they aspired. Nevertheless, two different types of behaviours 
can be displayed by satisficers. Some groups of satisficers may wait until their 
aspiration level is not being met before they react. They may then search for 
possibilities that will once again enable them to reach their aspiration level or adjust 
their aspiration level downwards or do both. Their behavioural approach is reactive. 
Others may anticipate or predict the possibility that their aspiration level will not be met 
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and take remedial action in advance. Their behaviour is proactive. 
Figure 3 illustrates a situation in which satisficers do not adopt agriculture even though 
its adoption would increase their income. In Figure 3, the ‘kinked’ relationship AFC 
represents the (envelope of) average product available to a Neolithic tribe. The segment 
AG is the average product available if the tribe relies only on foraging (to employ its 
units of labour) and the portion FC indicates the tribe’s average product and marginal 
product from embarking on agriculture. Assume that the aspirational and minimum 
acceptable satisfactory level of income per head for the tribe is y1. In other words, an 
income level per head of y1 or greater (a threshold value) is regarded as satisfactory by 
the tribe. Also suppose that L1units of labour are available. Then, by engaging only in 
hunting and gathering, the tribe can obtain an income per head of y2. This exceeds their 
minimum satisfactory level of income, y1, but does not maximise the tribe’s income per 
head. To maximise the tribe’s income per head, some labour needs to be employed in 
agriculture. For example, by employing L1– L0 units of labour in agriculture, the tribe’s 
income per head would increase to y3. However, a tribe will not choose this income-
raising option (nor the output-maximising one, which would require the marginal 
productivity of labour to be equal for both foraging and agriculture) if it is satisfied with 
an income per head of y2. Should, however, the tribe’s population increase beyond L�, it 
will be unable to obtain a satisfactory level of income. As a result, the tribe is likely to 
begin to search for opportunities which will increase its productivity or it may reduce its 
aspiration level of income. Both reactions may, of course, occur. The tribe may be 
inclined to commence agriculture in response to being stressed because it does not 
obtain a satisfactory level of income.  
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Figure 3: An illustration of satisficing behaviour and its influence on the choice 
between foraging and agriculture. 
 
In Weisdorf’s (2005) modelling, the level of population is assumed to be a constant 
multiple of the available units of labour. Both the number of available units of labour 
and the level of population are treated as an exogenous variable. Therefore, there is 
scope to extend Weisdorf’s analysis by considering influences on the size of the 
population and the labour force. For example, Childe (1936 [1965]) suggests that in 
agriculture the demand for labour is likely to be greater than in foraging and this favours 
population increase. Settled agriculture (that is a settled lifestyle) makes it less 
burdensome for a tribe to rear children. Caring for children is more burdensome given 
the nomadic lifestyle of hunting and gathering than it is given the sedentary lifestyle of 
agriculturalists. More importantly, children of agriculturalists contribute substantially 
more to food production than do the children of hunter-gatherers. Therefore, having 
children was less costly for early agriculturalists than for hunter-gatherers. Furthermore, 
food production per unit of land increased after agriculture, commenced and this 
triggered the first demographic explosion in history (Guzman and Weisdorf, 2011; 
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Childe, 1936 [1965]). Guzman and Weisdorf (2011) rely on optimisation as the basis for 
human behaviour. They suppose that the interdependent development of agriculture in 
Neolithic times with population growth can be explained by the optimising decisions of 
a representative agent. This is an ‘as if’ model which makes no allowance for 
behavioural diversity. The extent to which it mirrors reality is not obvious. 
Following the commencement of agriculture, it may also have been the case that women 
and children were increasingly required by males to engage in extra work to cultivate 
crops and tend to livestock. In many societies, a dominant class became established 
after agriculture became sufficiently established and this altered the social dynamics of 
economic growth (see, for example, Svizzero and Tisdell, 2014). 
Although Weisdorf’s (2005) model does help to integrate various theories of why many 
Neolithic societies adopted agriculture or failed to do so, it does not provide a 
sufficiently general framework to encompass the wider range of behavioural patterns 
that presumably existed in Neolithic societies, and which influenced the nature of social 
and economic evolution. Apart from the likelihood that different Neolithic societies 
adopted different decision-making procedures, neoclassical microeconomic modelling 
fails to take sufficient account of the bounded rationality and the social constraints 
involved in such societies in deciding whether to transit from foraging to agriculture. 
3. Economic Concepts and Human Behavioural Ecology 
As mentioned earlier in this article, Winterhalder and Kennett (2009, 2006) are strong 
advocates of the use of microeconomic concepts to explain the transition of foraging 
societies to agriculture, and they have identified a set of such concepts which they 
believe are very promising in this respect. Concepts identified by them as important 
include economic optimisation and opportunity costs (relative economic benefits). 
These are central concepts in Weisdorf’s (2005) analysis. However, as the above 
discussion reveals, these concepts seem to be incapable of explaining the adoption or 
non-adoption of agriculture by all Neolithic societies which were in a position to 
increase their levels of income by engaging to some extent in agricultural production. 
Furthermore, these authors mention that decision-making based on marginalism or 
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incrementalism is important. However, it seems that (at least, in some cases) the 
marginal adoption of agriculture was not a realistic option for all groups of foragers, 
because a discrete change in their social and economic organisation was required. This 
was illustrated above as involving a ‘lumpiness’ problem or as entailing significant 
overhead or initial costs.  
Winterhalder and Kennett (2006) identify optimisation, marginal values, opportunity 
costs, discounting and risk-sensitive behaviour as important concepts in considering the 
livelihood decisions of Neolithic societies. In Winterhalder and Kennett (2009), they 
add economies of scale and transaction costs to this list. We have already brought 
attention to possible limitations of the first three concepts in considering Weisdorf’s 
analysis of the transition of Neolithic societies to agriculture. It should also be observed 
that in adding economies of scale as a significant concept to their list, Winterhalder and 
Kennett restrict the scope for marginal or incremental change. This is because 
economies of scale can act as a barrier to entry to agriculture or to new forms of 
livelihood. This is because transition must be on a large enough scale to be economic 
and this also tends to increase the degree of risk involved in trying it.  
Compared to foraging, agriculture involves a longer delay before an economic return is 
obtained after effort is expended than does foraging. This is likely to retard the adoption 
of agriculture. Furthermore, in most cases, agriculture requires a larger regular 
investment than foraging3. In other words, the adoption of agriculture involved delayed 
economic returns and a larger investment compared to foraging. Presumably, some 
discounting of delayed economic returns in relation to the required investment was 
taken into account by Neolithic decision-makers. However, it is difficult to know in 
retrospect the level of the discount rate and what determined it in such societies. It is 
also probable that the (social) discount rate differed between tribes or bands4. One 
would expect that those groups having a high discount rate (high rate of time-
preference) would be less inclined to adopt agriculture than those with a lower discount 
rate, other things being held constant.  
One associated issue is the length of time taken into account by Neolithic societies in 
choosing development strategies. How long were their planning horizons? How myopic 
were they in choosing their development strategies and how realistic were they in 
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assessing possibilities? 
Furthermore, Winterhalder and Kennett (2009) stress the need to take account of risk-
sensitive behaviours in considering the transition of hunter-gatherers to agriculture but 
point out that little research has been done on this aspect. Presumably, geographical 
areas which had suitable natural endowments for agriculture (such as fertile soils, a 
stable climate and ready and reliable availability of water for watering crops) would 
have reduced the risks associated with transition. In addition, the ability to store food 
would have provided a safeguard against lower than expected crop yields. River valleys 
in the Middle East may have had natural resource endowments which reduced the risks 
of transition to agriculture compared with less suitable environments in early Neolithic 
times. In some areas of the Middle East, once a food surplus was obtained, it may have 
become economic to establish olive trees, grape vines, leguminous shrubs (chick peas) 
and other food perennials that took longer than annuals to bear edible food but which 
were also less reliant on natural conditions needed for the successful cultivation of 
annuals such as wheat and barley. 
An additional concept identified by Winterhalder and Kennett (2009, p. 647) as being 
important in understanding the economic evolution of Neolithic societies is transaction 
costs. Transaction costs are important in influencing the extent to which exchange takes 
place. Exchange is, as a rule, facilitated by lower transaction costs. Lower transaction 
costs can arise for several reasons. These include lower transport costs, greater trust and 
certainty between the parties involved in exchange, and increased knowledge of the 
possibilities for exchange. Childe (1950) points out that cities which grew up along 
rivers and navigable waterways in the Middle East were well placed to facilitate 
regional exchange of goods, because of their comparatively low level of transaction 
costs required for exchange of commodities. Trade can be an important factor in 
increasing national wealth and in reducing local economic risks. Presumably, the 
development of writing also facilitated trade because it allowed contracts to be specified 
in written form, thereby reducing uncertainty. Several of the clay tablets (based on 
cuneiform) in ancient Sumeria recorded contracts for exchange in commodities. 
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4. Discussion 
There is little doubt that the use of economic concepts can help us to better understand 
the economic evolution of Neolithic societies and the failure of some to shift to 
agriculture from hunting-gathering. However, the range of microeconomic models is 
wide and not all assume optimising behaviour by individuals or groups. It is clear that 
Neolithic societies varied considerably in their social organisation of production 
possibilities (see, for example, Kelly, 1995). Consequently, neoclassical microeconomic 
models, such as those applied by Weisdorf (2005), most likely fail to predict the 
behaviours of all Neolithic societies in deciding whether or not to commence 
agriculture, even when agriculture could increase their productivity. 
Furthermore, it is uncertain what ancient societies were intent on optimising and what 
their time-horizon and preferences for doing this were. How myopic were they in their 
decision-making and how realistic were they about their production possibilities? 
Testing for such past behavioural features seems to be a daunting task, especially in 
situations involving prehistory. Even written records may not provide reliable evidence 
of intent. This restricts the scientific basis for applying human behavioural ecology. 
The analysis of optimal behaviour is a key feature of both mainstream economic 
modelling and behavioural ecology. However, in both cases, there is difficulty in 
deciding accurately on what is being maximised or minimised, that is identifying the 
relevant objective function, and there is a temptation to assume that a single variable is 
being maximised or minimised. For example, profit maximisation by firms is a standard 
assumption in neoclassical economies, and maximising net energy return to hunter-
gatherers in searching for food was an objective used by Winterhalder (1981) in his 
early analysis of optimal foraging strategies. In both cases, these theories can be 
unreliable guides to actual behaviour and may fail to identify ‘successful’ behaviours 
(Tisdell, 2013, pp. 138-141). As the ecologist Marion Dawkins (1986, p. 21) stresses, 
efficient feeders may not be optimisers in a broad sense, because they may fail to pay 
adequate attention to predators and mating opportunities and therefore, are likely to be 
eliminated by natural selection. 
It could also be argued that Weisdorf’s (2005) model is a crude energy efficiency model 
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because it implies that output is maximised relative to the amount of labour employed 
which is an indicator of human energy expended. At the same time, his model assumes 
that the quantities of all commodities supplied whether by foraging or by agriculture can 
be measured in a common unit, even though they are heterogeneous. Consequently, a 
valuation problem is side-stepped. Furthermore, valuation problems are not fully 
resolved in the optimal foraging models outlined by Winterhalder (1981). As agriculture 
developed and as foraging became a relatively less important source of food, 
presumably the bundle of commodities available to humans altered. Therefore, with 
development, all goods were probably less likely to be valued by humans on the basis of 
their relative energy content even if they were so valued by Neolithic societies relying 
entirely on foraging. However, taking into account the findings of Bird-David (1992), 
the valuation of commodities in foraging societies cannot be attributed entirely to their 
energy content, and maximising net energy returns does not adequately explain the 
foraging strategies of all these societies. Bird-David provides specific examples of tribal 
groups who do not maximise their net energy returns from foraging. Furthermore, even 
in Neolithic societies, it seems unlikely that the utility of food to humans would have 
depended solely on its energy content, and consequently, the diet-breadth model 
developed in ecology to explain hunting by animals is likely to have limited 
applicability to human behaviour, despite the view of Winterhalder (1981). 
The extent to which rational choice (design) and chance determined the survival and 
economic well-being of ancient societies is not clear in retrospect. It might be thought 
that those who survived and prospered made optimal actual choices (see, for example, 
Smith and Winterhalder, 1992). However, it is also possible that many of the choices 
were chance events or not made based on rational optimising procedures. In retrospect, 
there is a temptation to attribute the survival and superior economic growth of societies 
compared to those that have failed or which have experienced economic stagnation to 
the superior rationality of the former, that is in their ability to maximise their chances of 
survival and foster economic growth. This assumes that survival of the fittest depended 
on the fittest being optimisers. However, in reality, chance rather than rational 
optimisation could have played a major role in the survival and economic growth of 
several societies which proved to be the fittest ex ante. Social Darwinism is a weak 
basis for contending in retrospect that the most successful surviving societies must have 
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been forward looking optimisers in the past. This is because this conclusion ignores the 
possibility that chance played an important role in the selection and survival of 
societies, as it also has done in the evolution of species (Gould, 1989, 1990). 
5. Concluding Comments 
Winterhalder and Kennett (2009, pp. 646-647), prominent advocates of human 
behavioural ecology, warn fellow anthropologists that economists are a danger because 
they ‘threaten to steal our subject matter with, intriguing ideas (Ofek, 2001), although 
without our empirical understanding of actual cases’. Furthermore, they contend that the 
‘analysis of the economy of early mixed or agricultural societies necessarily will 
employ terms with which they [economists] already are comfortable’ (Winterhalder and 
Kennett, 2009, p. 647). While these claims may be correct, these authors may fail to 
fully appreciate the variety of behavioural theories which are being applied by 
economists and the need to develop many of these theories further in order to apply 
them to the evolution of early societies. For example, while the economic analysis of 
Weisdorf (2005) relies on economic optimisation and opportunity costs to integrate 
many different theories, mostly of archaeologists and anthropologists and to provide the 
rationale for the transition (and non-transition) of foraging societies to agriculture, 
another economist(with a background in anthropology) John Gowdy (1998), adopts a 
satisficing behavioural framework to explain why some foragers did not adopt 
agriculture. Gowdy (1998) argues that many hunter-gatherers had (have) limited wants 
in relation to their means, and therefore, had (have) no incentive to switch to 
agriculture.  
Why such societies adopted a satisficing rather than an optimising approach to the 
economic change and the nature and dynamics of this satisficing behaviour requires 
further consideration. Furthermore, different types of apparent satisficing behaviour 
need to be considered. For example, there are at least three types of circumstances 
which can give rise to behaviour that appears to be of a satisficing nature.5 They are: (1) 
decision-makers have low levels of aspiration in relation to the goals they seek; (2) 
decision-makers are of the view that the cost of searching for choices which will 
improve outcomes is not worth the benefits; or (3) in relation to commodities, a stage is 
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reached where extra quantities of the available commodities are of no extra value or 
would cause disutility. In the latter case, a type of saturation is possible relative to the 
limited variety of commodities available to foragers, Case 1 would seem to fit 
Sahlins (1968) catch phrase as identified by Bird-David (1992, p. 34) of ‘Want not, lack 
not’, but it does not exactly fit Bird-David’s alternative of ‘Think rich, be rich’ because 
such a group of foragers would be rich (and could be made no richer) given their 
economic universe.  
Lee (1998, p. ix) points out that ‘for most economists, the supremacy of the market, the 
sanctity of property, and the centrality of the doctrine of economic man are sacred tenets 
of their craft. Orthodoxies of this kind deserve careful scrutiny…’ Although the concept 
of economic man has predictive value in some cases, it also has its limitations. Human 
behavioural ecologists need to pay greater attention to the limitations of the concept of 
economic man and should allow for a greater diversity of human behaviours (some of 
which are being revealed by advances in experimental and psychological economics) 
than those behaviours singled out by Winterhalder and Kennett (2006, 2009) for 
functional applications in anthropology.  
To conclude: Weisdorf’s (2005) analysis shows how the (neoclassical) microeconomic 
theory of optimal decision-making could be used to explain the evolution of Neolithic 
societies, that is their transit to agriculture or their non-transit to it. Furthermore, 
application of his analysis can be extended, for example to explain why some foragers 
after adopting agriculture returned to depend solely on foraging for their subsistence. 
However, this theory has not been tested and it leaves out of account several factors 
which appear to have been important influences on the behaviours of some Neolithic 
societies. Those identified in this article included cultural and knowledge factors, 
random influences on choice sets as well as the possible adoption by some societies of 
satisficing-like behaviour. In our view, human behaviours are diverse as well as the 
nature of the possibilities for economic and social transformation and a single 
microeconomic model of the type proposed by Weisdorf fails to adequately capture the 
extent of this diversity. Therefore, on its own, it cannot satisfactorily explain the 
economic and social evolution of all Neolithic societies. A wider range of theories (ideal 
types) is needed to do this. Similarly the optimisation models proposed by human 
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behavioural ecologists seem to be too narrow in their perspective and they need also to 
be supplemented by additional theories. Although human behavioural ecologists have 
proposed specific optimisation models to explain the possible foraging strategies of 
hunter-gatherers, they have not articulated the particular type of model developed by 
Weisdorf. Nonetheless, Weisdorf’s model is compatible with the type of approach 
favoured by human behavioural ecologists. Behavioural ecologists may, however, feel 
that a worthwhile objective would be to extend his model taking into account those 
types of economic concepts which are identified by Winterhalder and Kennett 
(Winterhalder and Kennett, 2009, 2006) as promising. In doing this, some 
incompatibilities could arise. For example, in some cases, marginal changes in 
economic and social activities and structuring may be blocked by the occurrence of 
economies of scale and similar impediments. 
6. Notes 
1. Those who adopt this approach (for example, Winterhalder and Smith, 1992; Smith 
and Winterhalder, 1992) draw on evolutionary ecology to support it in conjunction 
with optimisation analysis. Smith and Winterhalder (1992, p. 52) state that 
‘optimization analysis is a convenient heuristic tool or simplication for analysing 
evolutionary outcomes.’ They specifically reject satisficing models mainly on the 
basis that those who fail to optimise will be eliminated by competition generated by 
those who optimise (Smith and Winterhalder, 1992, p. 54). Most of the types of 
arguments advanced by Smith and Winterhalder (1992) in favour of optimisation 
models as a basis of human behaviour had also been put forward by economists 
(see, for example, Tisdell, 2013, Chs. 6 and 7). 
2. Models of early agriculture include consideration of shifting cultivation as a basis 
for Neolithic food production. This is considered to be an “anti-surplus” mode of 
production not conducive to the creation of ‘state’ hierarchy (Sahlins, 1974) 
3. This was true in immediate-return foraging societies in which food was consumed 
on the spot or soon after. However, in delayed return foraging societies, food and 
other resources might be stored for months or years with marked effects on social 
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organization and cultural notions of property (Woodburn, 1982). 
4. This is evidenced by Tucker (2007, p. 204). He uses an experiment to estimate the 
discount rate (the rate of time preference) of Mikea hunter-gatherers-horticulturalists 
currently living in southwestern Madagascar. 
5. In addition, as mentioned above, satisficing-like behaviour may be of a prospective 
or reactive nature. 
7 References 
Bird-David, N. (1992). "Beyond the original affluent society: a culturalist 
reformulation." Review of. Current Anthropology 33 (1):25-34. 
Chambers, R.J. (1987). "Sustainable Livelihoods Environmental Development: Putting 
Poor People First." In. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of 
Sussex. 
Childe, V.G. (1936 [1965]). Man Makes Himself. London: Watts. 
Childe, V.G. (1950). "The urban revolution." Review of. The Town Planning Review 21 
(1):3-17. 
Courchamp, F., J. Berec, and J. Gascoigne. (2008). Allee Effects in Ecology and 
Conservation. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dawkins, M.S. (1986). Unravelling Animal Behaviour. London: Longman. 
Gould, S.J. (1989). Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History. New 
York: Norton. 
Gould, S.J. (1990). The Individuals in Darwin's World. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Gowdy, J. (1998). "Introduction: back to the future and forward to the past." In Limited 
Wants and Unlimited Means: A Reader on Hunter-Gatherer Economics and the 
Environment, edited by J. Gowdy. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Guzman, R.A., and J. Weisdorf. (2011). "The Neolithic revolution from a price-
theoretic perspective." Review of. Journal of Development Economics 96 
(2):209-19. 
Hayek, F. (1948). Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago, IL: Chicago University 
20 
 
Press. 
Kelly, R.L. (1995). The Foraging Spectrum: Diversity in Hunter-Gatherer Lifeways. 
Washington and London: Smithsonian Institutions Press. 
Kuczynski, M., and R.L. Meek. (1972). "Quesnay's Tableau économique." In. London: 
Macmillan. 
Lee, R.B. (1998). "'Foreword'." In Limited Wants and Unlimited Means: A Reader on 
Hunter-Gatherer Economics and the Environment, edited by J. Gowdy. 
Washington DC: Island Press. 
Lee, R.B., and R.H. Daly. (2004). "Introduction: foragers and others." In The 
Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Hunters and Gatherers, edited by R.B. Lee and 
R.H. Daly, 1-19. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. 
Ofek, H. (2001). Second Nature: Economic Origins of Human Evolution. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sahlins, M. (1968). "Notes on the original affluent society." In Man the Hunter, edited 
by R.B. Lee and I. de Vore, 85-9. Chicago: Aldine. 
Sahlins, M. (1974). Stone Age Economics. London: Tavistock. 
Smith, E.A., and B. Winterhalder. (1992). "Natural selection and decision-making: 
some fundamental principles." In Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior, 
edited by E.A. Smith and B. Winterhalder, 25-60. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Svizzero, S., and C A. Tisdell. (2014). "Inequality and wealth in ancient history: 
Malthus' theory reconsidered." Review of. Economics & Sociology 7 (3):223-40. 
Tisdell, Clement Allan. (2013). Competition, Diversity and Economic Performance: 
Processes, Complexities, and Ecological Similarities. Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Tucker, B. (2007). "Applying behavioral ecology and behavioral economics to 
conservation and development planning: an example from the Mikea forest 
Madagascar." Review of. Human Nature 18:190-208. 
Veblen, T. (1934). The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the 
Evolution of Institutions. New York: The Macmillan Company. 
Weisdorf, J.L. (2005). "From foraging to farming: explaining the Neolithic Revolution." 
Review of. Journal of Economic Surveys 19:561-86. 
Winterhalder, B. (1981). "Optimal foraging strategies and hunter-gatherer research in 
21 
 
anthropology: theory and models." In Hunter-Gatherer Foraging Strategies, 
edited by B. Winterhalder and E.A. Smith, 13-35. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Winterhalder, B., and D.J. Kennett. (2006). "Behavioral ecology and the transition from 
hunting and gathering to agriculture." In Behavioral Ecology and the Transition 
to Agriculture, edited by D.J. Kennett and B. Winterhalder, 1-21. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Winterhalder, B., and D.J. Kennett. (2009). "Four neglected concepts with a role to play 
in explaining the origins of agriculture." Review of. Current Anthropology 
50:645-8. 
Winterhalder, B., and E.A. Smith. (1981). Hunter-Gatherer Foraging Strategies: 
Ethnographic and Acheological Analyses. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Winterhalder, B., and E.A. Smith. (1992). "Evolutionary ecology and social sciences." 
In Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior, edited by E.A. Smith and B. 
Winterhalder. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Woodburn, J. (1982). "Egalitarian Societies." Review of. Man 17 (3):431-51. 
 
 
 
  
22 
 
 PREVIOUS WORKING PAPERS IN THE SERIES 
ECONOMIC THEORY, APPLICATIONS AND ISSUES 
 
1. Externalities, Thresholds and the Marketing of New Aquacultural Products: Theory and 
Examples by Clem Tisdell, January 2001. 
2. Concepts of Competition in Theory and Practice by Serge Svizzero and Clem Tisdell, 
February 2001. 
3. Diversity, Globalisation and Market Stability by Laurence Laselle, Serge Svizzero and 
Clem Tisdell, February 2001. 
4. Globalisation, the Environment and Sustainability: EKC, Neo-Malthusian Concerns and 
the WTO by Clem Tisdell, March 2001. 
5. Globalization, Social Welfare, Labor Markets and Fiscal Competition by Clem Tisdell and 
Serge Svizzero, May 2001. 
6. Competition and Evolution in Economics and Ecology Compared by Clem Tisdell, May 
2001. 
7. The Political Economy of Globalisation: Processes involving the Role of Markets, 
Institutions and Governance by Clem Tisdell, May 2001. 
8. Niches and Economic Competition: Implications for Economic Efficiency, Growth and 
Diversity by Clem Tisdell and Irmi Seidl, August 2001. 
9. Socioeconomic Determinants of the Intra-Family Status of Wives in Rural India: An 
Extension of Earlier Analysis by Clem Tisdell, Kartik Roy and Gopal Regmi, August 2001. 
10. Reconciling Globalisation and Technological Change: Growing Income Inequalities and 
Remedial Policies by Serge Svizzero and Clem Tisdell, October 2001. 
11. Sustainability: Can it be Achieved? Is Economics the Bottom Line? by Clem Tisdell, 
October 2001. 
12. Tourism as a Contributor to the Economic Diversification and Development of Small 
States: Its Strengths, Weaknesses and Potential for Brunei by Clem Tisdell, March 2002. 
13. Unequal Gains of Nations from Globalisation by Clem Tisdell, Serge Svizzero and 
Laurence Laselle, May 2002. 
14. The WTO and Labour Standards: Globalisation with Reference to India by Clem Tisdell, 
May 2002. 
15. OLS and Tobit Analysis: When is Substitution Defensible Operationally? by Clevo Wilson 
and Clem Tisdell, May 2002. 
16. Market-Oriented Reforms in Bangladesh and their Impact on Poverty by Clem Tisdell and 
Mohammad Alauddin, May 2002. 
17. Economics and Tourism Development: Structural Features of Tourism and Economic 
Influences on its Vulnerability by Clem Tisdell, June 2002. 
18. A Western Perspective of Kautilya’s Arthasastra: Does it Provide a Basis for Economic 
Science? by Clem Tisdell, January 2003. 
19. The Efficient Public Provision of Commodities:  Transaction Cost, Bounded Rationality 
and Other Considerations. 
20. Globalization, Social Welfare, and Labor Market Inequalities by Clem Tisdell and Serge 
Svizzero, June 2003. 
21. A Western Perspective on Kautilya’s ‘Arthasastra’ Does it Provide a Basis for Economic 
Science?, by Clem Tisdell, June 2003. 
22. Economic Competition and Evolution: Are There Lessons from Ecology? by Clem Tisdell, 
June 2003. 
23. Outbound Business Travel Depends on Business Returns: Australian Evidence by Darrian 
Collins and Clem Tisdell, August 2003. 
23 
 
24. China’s Reformed Science and Technology System: An Overview and Assessment by 
Zhicun Gao and Clem Tisdell, August 2003. 
25. Efficient Public Provision of Commodities: Transaction Costs, Bounded Rationality and 
Other Considerations by Clem Tisdell, August 2003. 
26. Television Production: Its Changing Global Location, the Product Cycle and China by 
Zhicun Gao and Clem Tisdell, January 2004. 
27. Transaction Costs and Bounded Rationality – Implications for Public Administration and 
Economic Policy by Clem Tisdell, January 2004. 
28. Economics of Business Learning: The Need for Broader Perspectives in Managerial 
Economics by Clem Tisdell, April 2004. 
29. Linear Break-Even Analysis: When is it Applicable to a Business? By Clem Tisdell, April 
2004. 
30. Australia’s Economic Policies in an Era of Globalisation by Clem Tisdell, April 2004. 
31. Tourism Development as a Dimension of Globalisation: Experiences and Policies of China 
and Australia by Clem Tisdell, May 2004. 
32. Can Globalisation Result in Less Efficient and More Vulnerable Industries? by Clem 
Tisdell, October 2004. 
33. An Overview of Globalisation and Economic Policy Responses by Clem Tisdell, 
November 2004. 
34. Changing Abundance of Elephants and Willingness to Pay for their Conservation by 
Ranjith Bandara and Clem Tisdell, December 2004. 
35. Economic Globalisation: The Process and its Potential Social, Economic, and 
Environmental Impacts by Clem Tisdell, October 2005. 
36. Introduction: An Overview and Assessment of The Economics of Leisure by Clem Tisdell, 
November 2005. 
37. Globalisation and the Economic Future of Small Isolated Nations, Particularly in the 
Pacific by Clem Tisdell, November 2005. 
38. Business Partnerships in a Globalising World: Economic Considerations by Clem Tisdell, 
December 2005. 
39. Economic and Business Relations Between Australia and China: An Overview and 
an Assessment by Clem Tisdell, November 2006. 
40. China’s Economic Performance and Transition in Relation to Globalisation: From 
Isolation to Centre-Stage? by Clem Tisdell, November 2006. 
41. Knowledge and the Valuation of Public Goods and Experiential Commodities: 
Information Provision and Acquisition by Clem Tisdell, November 2006. 
42. Students’ Evaluation of Teaching Effectiveness: What Surveys Tell and What They 
Do Not Tell by Clem Tisdell and Mohammad Alauddin, November 2006. 
43. Economic Prospects for Small Island Economies, Particularly in the South Pacific, 
in a Globalising World by Clem Tisdell, November 2006. 
44. The Evolution and Classification of the Published Books of Clem Tisdell: A Brief 
Overview by Clem Tisdell, July 2007. 
45. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Economic Globalization by Clem Tisdell, January 2008. 
46. Economic Benefits and Drawbacks of Cities and their Growth Implications by Clem 
Tisdell, January, 2008. 
47. Interfirm Networks in the Indonesian Garment Industry: Trust and Other Factors in 
their Formation and Duration and their Marketing Consequences by Latif Adam and 
Clem Tisdell, April, 2008. 
48. Trust and its Implications for Economic Activity, Welfare and Globalisation by 
Clem Tisdell, April, 2008. 
49. Economics, Corporate Sustainability and Social Responsibility by Clem Tisdell, 
May 2008. 
24 
 
50. Structural Transformation in the Pig Sector in an Adjusting Vietnam Market: A 
Preliminary Investigation of Supply-side Changes by Clem Tisdell, September 2008 
51. Thirty Years of Economic Reform and Openness in China: Retrospect and Prospect 
by Clem Tisdell, October 2008. 
52. Quantitative Impacts of Teaching Attributes on University TEVAL Scores And 
Their Implications by Clem Tisdell and Mohammad Alauddin, April 2009. 
53. A Comparative Economic Study of the Chinese and Australian Cotton Production 
by Xufu Zhao and Clem Tisdell, May 2009 
54. Trends in Vietnam’s Pork Supply and Structural Features of its Pig Sector by Clem 
Tisdell, May 2009. 
55. Economic Reform and Openness in China: China’s Development Policies in the 
Last 30 Years by Clem Tisdell, June 2009. 
56. The Survival of Small-scale Agricultural Producers in Asia, particularly Vietnam: 
General Issues Illustrated by Vietnam’s Agricultural Sector, especially its Pig 
Production by Clem Tisdell, June 2009. 
57. Economic Benefits and Drawbacks of Cities and their Growth Implications by Clem 
Tisdell, September 2009. 
58. Economic Challenges Faced by Small Island Economies: An Overview by Clem 
Tisdell, September, 2009. 
59. Natural Protection from International Competition in the Livestock Industry: 
Analysis, Examples and Vietnam’s Pork Market as a Case by Clem Tisdell, Ma. 
Lucila Lapar, Steve Staal and Nguyen Ngoc Que. November, 2009. 
60. Agricultural Development in Transitional Asian Economies: Observations Prompted 
by a Livestock Study in Vietnam by Clem Tisdell. May 2010 
61. An Economic Study of Small Pigholders in Vietnam: Some Insights Gained and the 
Scope for Further Research by Clem Tisdell, May 2010. 
62. The Excitement and Value of Discovering Tourism Economics: Clem Tisdell’s 
Journey by Clem Tisdell, May 2010. 
63. The Competitiveness of Small Household Pig Producers in Vietnam: Significant 
Research and Policy Findings from an ACIAR-sponsored Study and their 
Limitations by Clem Tisdell, November 2010. 
64. Animal Health Economics. What Can It Do? What Are The Big Questions? By 
Clem Tisdell December 2010. 
65. Agriculture, Structural Change and Socially Responsible Development in China and 
Vietnam. By Clem Tisdell, April 2012. 
66. My Book, “Economic Development in the Context of China”: Its Origins plus 
Experiences in China in 1989 and their Sequel”. Clem Tisdell, August, 2013. 
67. Information Technology’s Impacts on Productivity, Welfare and Social Change: 
General Observations. Clem Tisdell, July, 2014. 
68. Theories about the Commencement of Agriculture in Prehistoric Societies: A 
Critical Evaluation by Serge Svizzero and Clement Tisdell, August 2014. 
69. Inequality and Wealth Creation in Ancient History: Malthus’ Theory Reconsidered 
by Serge Svizzero and Clement Tisdell, September, 2014. 
70. Information Technology’s Impacts on Productivity, Welfare and Social Change: 
Second Version by Clement Tisdell, December 2014. 
 
 
